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Abstract 
In his presidential address to the Regional Science Association over thirty years ago, William 
Alonso presented the case for “five bell shapes in development” and argued that “the developed 
countries will enter fully in to the realm of the right-hand tail of these curves” (p. 16) and that 
this transition might result in several surprises. He proposed, therefore, that we should study the 
right tail of these “curves,” as well as interactions among them. Much of what Alonso suggested 
has come to pass, although his prognostications were not always exact. And although he touched 
on several issues of relevance to regional scientists, the discipline has been slow to move away 
from a growth-centered paradigm. The strength of regional science—the capacity to consider 
economic, demographic, and geographical aspects of an issue simultaneously—has yet to be 
focused on some of the “right-hand” challenges that have arisen, population loss, for example. In 
this paper, we provide a review of regional science research within the context of Alonso’s five 
bells and hypothesize how Alonso’s propositions might differ in today’s world. We then focus 
more specifically on one particular area: population loss. Using these examples allows us to 
highlight how regional science might contribute to the conceptualization of “right-hand tail” 
development challenges, especially where theory, issues of spatial scale, and interregional 
dependencies are concerned. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT GOES UP MUST COME DOWN 
It is a basic rule of life, encountered by most children at an early age: what goes up must come 
down. Gravity may be defied, but only temporarily, before physical laws prevail. Fundamental 
laws are more difficult to establish where the social or economic world is concerned, and social 
scientists have expended decades’ worth of research effort in attempting to lay out inviolable 
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rules that govern aspects of human behavior. In the social sciences in general—and regional 
science is certainly no exception—attention has tended to focus on aspects of growth or 
equilibrium, whether related to population, economies, governments, or human behavior. When 
lack of growth is examined, it is generally within a larger context of explaining why deviations 
occur and what—especially where economic disparities are concerned—can be done to 
ameliorate them. So, for example, literature on determinants of economic growth, regional 
economic convergence, core-periphery disparities, and urbanization abounds in regional science. 
Even sub-fields such as spatial optimization or retail geography tend to focus on best locations 
for new facilities or maximizing coverage within a context of population growth. But what if lack 
of growth or even decline were to become the new “normal?” 
 
In 1937—almost 80 years ago—Keynes highlighted the inability of humankind to deal with 
decline. “The future never resembles the past.” Nevertheless, we as stakeholders, policymakers, 
or researchers tend to “assume that the future will resemble the past.” Even when economic or 
population decline is apparent “most of us offer a great resistance of acting on it in practice” 
(Keynes 1937, 13). In fact, many theories subscribe to the notion that rapid growth cannot be 
sustained indefinitely. This holds for products, as explained in the product-life-cycle theory, as 
well as for countries (Rostow 1960). Even though stages of rapid (economic) growth are known 
to be temporal, and are likely to be followed by moderate growth and possibly even decline, this 
is generally seen as inappropriate and rejected by both politicians and researchers. From this 
perspective the future does resemble the past: in spite of economic recessions between 2008 and 
2013 and population decline taking place in many regions in the world, by far the majority of 
academic and policy publications focus on and assume growth.  
 
Within our own discipline, an exhortation for regional scientists to devote attention to the 
alternatives to growth goes back at least as far as 1980 and William Alonso’s Presidential 
Address to the Regional Science Association (Alonso 1980). In his address, Alonso outlines five 
basic principles—the rise and fall of (1) economic growth, (2) social inequality, (3) regional 
inequality, (4) geographic concentration, and (5) the demographic transitions—that have guided 
social scientists’ engagement with the world around them. In spite of his persuasive argument 
that social and regional scientists should consider post-growth scenarios or even paradigms, in 
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general Alonso’s call has gone unheeded. This is unfortunate. In this paper, we suggest that, even 
in cases in which Alonso’s conclusions proved short-sighted (for example, the temporary nature 
of the counter-urbanization phenomenon of the 1970s or the non-materialization of equalizing 
effects of the regional economic convergence process implied by traditional economic growth 
models), his underlying rationale was solid. We argue that the timing is now right for regional 
scientists to re-engage with Alonso’s proposal that we devote research energy to the “right side,” 
or inverse of the five growth-oriented curves discussed in his paper and that impending 
population loss occurring in many areas of the developed world offers a forcible incentive to do 
so. 
 
This paper makes two propositions. The first is that the world is changing and growth or 
expansion, whether economic or demographic, should no longer serve as the sole paradigmatic 
guiding light. Inequality, decline, equilibrium, or stagnation may in fact be the new reality. 
Perhaps lagging regions will never catch up to their peers. More dramatically, perhaps any 
regional convergence that has been achieved is only temporary and anomalous, and the real 
equilibrium is one of disparity. If this is the case, research and policy development should be 
palliative: less about encouraging uniformity and more about helping unfortunate areas, regions, 
and people to achieve and maintain a certain quality of life (i.e. Blank 2015).  
 
The second proposition is that population decline epitomizes the sorts of topics to which Alonso 
was referring in his address: not only the relevance of each of his five bells for the subject, but 
also the interactions across bells that must be considered in order for theory, models, and policy 
to be developed. Population decline sits at a regional science crossroads: it is spatial, 
demographic, and economic at once. Nevertheless, it is an understudied topic in regional science, 
but one that is, nonetheless, here to stay, and that would benefit from the expertise that regional 
scientists converted to Alonso’s views could bring to the subject.1 Building understanding of the 
myriad aspects of decline requires researchers positioned to wrangle with social, geographic, 
demographic, and economic components—all at once. This is a strength of regional science. 
                                                     
1 Demography, of course, underpins every aspect of regional science. It is either the subject of direct study, as in the case of migration, human 
capital, or urbanization, or it is one key element that plays a role in some larger system or process. 
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Thus, the goals of this paper are twofold. First, we aim to reintroduce Alonso’s argument that the 
right hand side of his five curves matters and that we in regional science have constrained 
ourselves overlong to the left-hand case (something like perpetual growth). Second, we seek to 
provide some ideas of what right-side regional science might look like—and we accomplish this 
through the important case study of population decline. The order of the paper is as follows. In 
section 2 we provide a brief recapitulation of Alonso’s five bells, emphasizing those aspects 
most relevant to regional scientists. The subsequent section covers the extent to which Alonso’s 
prognostications have played out and how regional science has contributed knowledge to each 
area of research. Sections 4 and 5 are the crux of the paper: here we imagine what “right-side” 
regional science might look like and opine on the theory, expertise, and topical insight such a 
perspective might generate. We then focus more specifically on the subject of population 
decline, with the aim of offering a firm example of the utility of Alonso’s views, as well as to 
build interest within the field of regional science in the study of decline. In section 6 we offer 
conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. ALONSO’S FIVE BELLS 
In his presidential address, Alonso (1980) collapses the development process into five inter-
related bells, or curves. Neither the assumption of a bell shape nor the description itself is meant 
to be taken as a rule or law. Rather, Alonso posits them as “heuristics” or guiding principles that 
help shed light on particular aspects of development. By focusing on Alonso’s approach to 
integrating social and economic theories, we do not imply that his is the only or even, 
necessarily, the best perspective. And certainly regional science is not the sole discipline capable 
of such an exercise. Arguably, new insights can be generated through any effort at 
deconstructing and then reassembling established theories or worldviews. Alonso’s address still 
resonates, however, especially for those researchers interested in the spatial or regional aspects 
of development.  
 
By Alonso’s reckoning, the five bell-shaped processes in development are (1) the stages of 
economic development, (2) social inequality, (3) regional inequality, (4) geographic 
concentration, and (5) the demographic transition. The first process, development itself, simply 
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characterizes the pace at which development occurs: a rapid pace that, at some point, slows. This 
simple proposition suggests in some way the remaining four. As a country or region moves 
through the stages of development, social inequality increases within an area across different 
socio-economic dimensions such as race, class, or occupation. At some point, increases in social 
inequality slow or even decrease, as the fruits of economic development diffuse from a relatively 
small group to the larger. This is the well-known Kuznets relationship between economic growth 
and inequality. This relationship carries the implication that temporary increases in inequality 
that occur with growth are justifiable, given the longer-term expectation that inequality 
eventually decreases after a certain level of development (Kuznets 1955).  
 
Concurrently, according to Alonso, development leads to increased spatial inequality in levels of 
development across regions. Some areas grow and some lag behind, with the result that the 
benefits of economic growth are not only distributed unequally across groups but also across 
regions. This too is expected to be temporary: after a certain level of development is attained, 
inter-regional movements of labor and capital should see development begin to level out across 
regions. The fourth proposition, geographic concentration, will also be familiar to regional 
scientists. Original locations of economic activity will draw in further resources and people, 
leading to concentrations of firms, people, and activity in general. Again, after some inflection 
point, other areas will begin to look more favorable and a de-concentration or dispersion of 
activity should be observed.  
 
Finally, in parallel with economic development come demographic changes: lower fertility and 
mortality rates, with downward shifts timed in such a fashion that rapid population growth is 
observed, followed subsequently by a balance in birth and death rates that leads to stable 
population sizes (Notestein 1945, Kirk 1996). This relationship between development and 
demographic change is summarized by the demographic transition theory. Although often 
criticized, this remains a basic tenet of geography, sociology, demography, and history, to name 
a few social science disciplines, with numerous studies aiming to establish the validity of the 
theory for a particular time and place. Along with criticisms that the theory may not hold even in 
retrospect (to say nothing of countries currently developing), is another one very similar to 
Alonso’s: how does the demographic transition accommodate below replacement level fertility? 
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Put another way, how does the theory accommodate very observable population decline 
occurring in many regions of the world, as opposed to stability or growth? 
 
A few notable points stand out from the whirlwind tour of development processes outlined 
above. First, of course, they are all interconnected and to understand one facet of development is 
to need to consider others. This is an important argument in Alonso’s paper. Also, each process, 
if imagined as a bell curve, necessarily suggests the existence of an inflection point—that is, 
there is some point at which things change. This does not necessitate that the inflection point will 
be the same for each curve—that geographic concentration of activity and social and spatial 
inequality, for example, will all start to change at the same point of an area’s economic 
development. It does argue, though, that there is an identifiable inflection point and that what 
comes after will be different.  
 
3. THE RIGHT-HAND TAILS OF THE BELLS: ALONSO WAS RIGHT 
Alonso has a great many things to say about his five bells; it is his prescience in highlighting the 
value of the “right-hand tails,” though, that we focus on here. Where these tails are concerned, 
better words than Alonso’s are difficult to find: “When the pace of development slows, how 
much does it slow? Does the process of regional equalization end with all regions equal?...Does 
fertility drop to the point exactly at which births balance deaths?” (Alonso 1980, 12). 
Observations about the future are necessarily predicated upon past experience. In 1980, Alonso 
foresaw the future through the lens of the tumultuous 1970s and what he perceived as the 
approaching tails of his five bells; his exact predictions have not all come to be, however overall 
his points remain valid. Below we assess what the past thirty-five years have contributed to 
knowledge where these points are concerned, where Alonso’s predictions have proven accurate 
(or not), and how regional science has contributed to our understanding of each. 
 
Economic development 
Before 1750, practically no economic growth took place worldwide. Nevertheless, the 
assumption of ongoing economic growth, based on Solow’s Nobel prize-awarded work of 1956, 
is widely accepted (Gordon 2012). Recently, the World Bank revised its 2016 global growth 
forecast down to 2.4 percent. “The move is due to sluggish growth in advanced economies, 
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stubbornly low commodity prices, weak global trade, and diminishing capital flows” (Worldbank 
2016a). The recent political instabilities and challenges taking place around the world are likely 
to impose further limitations to economic growth at the world level and in the advanced 
economies. 
 
Almost a decade before Alonso’s presidential address, in 1972, discussion started on “The Limits 
to Growth” (Meadows et al. 1972). During the period of economic prosperity and stability in the 
nineties and early 2000s the debate faded, but the recent economic crises, as well as the 
increasing challenges posed by climate change and political developments revived the interest in 
the left-hand tails of economic growth. In and of itself, limited economic growth could present 
less of a challenge than does growth’s interaction with other topics. The relationship between 
economic growth and scarcity of resources (e.g. land, oil, clean air and clean water) is important, 
for example. Technological advances are supposed to “decouple” gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth from “material throughput,” but other than for energy this development cannot be found 
(Jackson 2011). A drawback of many technological advances is however the decoupling of 
production from labor input. Only when demand increases, can the same number of jobs be 
sustained. Theoretically, economic growth is necessary to prevent and/or reduce poverty (see 
also the Worldbank 2016a). The recent economic crisis, however, led to the realization that 
eternal growth can be questioned. This is also the focus of the recent debate on “secular 
stagnation,” where researchers have emphasized the importance and drawbacks of negative 
interest rates as the traditional and perhaps only tool left to link saving and investment in order to 
go back to full employment (Summers 2014).   
 
Social inequality 
Indeed, the second bell, “predicts” lower social inequality after a certain level of “advanced” 
economic development. This bell is perhaps the most idealistic one and in fact the economic 
growth models on which it is predicated are now widely questioned (Barca et al. 2012). 
Unfortunately, according to Milanovic (2012), the global level of inequality in terms of 
purchasing power did not improve between 1980 and 2005. Also, Deininger and Squire (1996) 
do not find the expected causal relationship between growth and changes in aggregate inequality. 
Although average income levels between countries might have become more equal, inequality 
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within certain countries has increased. This holds in particular for China2 but also for countries 
such as Germany and Sweden (OECD 2011). Oxfam (Hardoon et al. 2016) reported even that 
“62 people own as much as the poorest half of the world's population.” On a more positive side, 
there is evidence of a positive relationship between economic growth and the reduction of 
poverty (Deininger and Squire 1996). 
 
Regional inequality 
This increasing intra-country inequality also implies larger regional inequalities. In Britain, GDP 
per person in the richest region in 2011 was five times more than the national average and almost 
ten times more than the income of residents of the poorest area (Economist 2011). Williamson 
(1965), who was one of the first to study regional inequalities, concluded that American regions 
converged between the 1950s and 1960s. However, Amos (1988) determined that between 1969 
and 1983 regional inequality had increased again. Thus he concluded that regional inequality is 
likely to follow an increase-decrease-increase pattern, contrary to a simple U- or bell form. More 
recently, Artelaris and Petrakos (2016) confirm this pattern for the EU-27. In the United States, 
the famous manufacturing belt is a good example of such regional dynamics. Regional economic 
development was enormous in the 1960s, partly thanks to car manufacturing activities. Initially, 
this resulted in strong income inequalities, both within and between neighboring regions. 
However, in the next phase, manufacturing jobs drew many labor migrants to the area, resulting 
in a diffusion of effects over secondary (residential) cities. The late twentieth century brought 
back increased regional inequalities, mainly because of the departure of capital to low-wage 
countries (Fan and Casseti 1994), resulting in a reversed inequality with low incomes in the main 
cities such as Detroit. Certainly, both regional and social inequality appear to be here to stay for 
the longer term. 
 
Regional concentration 
The concept of strong—mostly positive—synergies amongst clustered economic activities 
appeals to both researchers and policy makers. Regional concentration, and in particular 
agglomeration effects, remains among the favorite topics of regional scientists. Urbanization is 
                                                     
2 Nevertheless, in the case of China (and to a lesser extent India) the increase in inequality does go hand in hand with a sharp reduction of poverty 
(Ferreira et al., 2012). 
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one of the strongest spatial trends of the last few decades. The world not only reached a 
milestone in 2007, when more than half of the population lived in urban areas, but the share of 
people living in settlements with over 1 million inhabitants also increased steadily to over 22 
percent in 2014 (Worldbank 2016b). However, in most developed countries, such as Europe and 
the U.S., population concentration has seemed to stabilize at 75-80 percent urban. Whether we 
can still reasonably expect a decrease in urbanization is an interesting question. We do see 
shrinking cities in all parts of the world, including the United States and Europe. The Urban 
Audit of the European Union shows that “out of 220 large and medium-sized European cities, 57 
percent of the cities and 54 percent of the larger urban zones lost population in the period from 
1996 to 2001” (Wiechmann and Pallagst 2012, 264). At the same time, in particular in Europe, 
with its polycentric urban structure, higher growth rates of smaller centers takes place (Dijkstra 
et al. 2013). Nevertheless, there remains a strong policy emphasis on productivity improvements 
in large agglomerations (Scott and Storper 2007). In addition, the discussion on efficiency versus 
equity has intensified, as isolated policies that aim to enforce agglomerations often results in 
larger (regional) income disparities (Scott and Storper 2007). 
 
Demographic transition 
We all know that fertility rates did not stabilize at the replacement level as Alonso expected or 
hoped for. Although rapid population growth has halted for most developed countries, what has 
in fact been observed in many is a slow shift towards population shrinkage—a surfeit of deaths 
over births that is occasionally only partially mediated by positive net international immigration 
flows. In Europe in the year 2000 the “negative momentum” started: a tendency of declining 
population, particular in the younger cohorts, due to lowered fertility rates (Lutz et al. 2003). 
Next to this, longer life expectancies result both in developed and developing countries in ageing 
populations. Although decline and aging often share a common cause in low birth rates, there is 
no causality between them (Coleman and Rowthorn 2011). Another important demographic 
change is the changing household composition: average household size has decreased 
considerably in many parts of the world. Over the last four decades, in the Netherlands average 
household size decreased from 2.95 to 2.19 and in the United States from 2.94 to 2.54. This 
means that population decline in many places is accompanied by an increase in the number of 
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households (Coleman and Rowthorn 2011), potentially obscuring the eventual impacts of decline 
on housing and labor markets. 
 
4. RIGHT-HAND REGIONAL SCIENCE 
Although all five of Alonso’s bells underpin regional science knowledge, three are explicitly 
spatial and have generated more interest on the part of regional researchers: the path of 
development in general, spatial inequality, and geographic concentration. Each of these three 
curves calls upon the particular strengths of regional science, requiring the use of spatially 
disaggregated data and the tools and methods to work with them; the development of spatially 
explicit theories or understanding of spatial processes; and the ability to synthesize information 
from a range of disciplines. A consideration of any regional science compilation (for example, 
Florax and Plane 2004 or Fischer and Nijkamp 2014) highlights the focus regional scientists 
have devoted to research areas related to these three bells. Concepts such as clusters, spatial 
mismatch, or agglomeration provide insight about geographical concentration, as well as spatial 
inequality, while research on networks, transportation, and spatial interaction are all predicated 
on the existence of a set of areas that are somehow co-dependent—and often unequal. Innovation 
and diffusion models, as well as input-output methods, also reinforce connectivity across entities, 
as well as regions. And virtually all regional science methods, especially spatial econometrics 
and spatial analytic tools in general, are honed on the whetstone of regional growth models or 
models of regional economic convergence. That is to say, the methods may not have been 
originally predicated on urban or regional economic growth models, but within regional science 
these are the methods frequently brought to bear to test growth hypotheses (see, e.g., Rey and 
Montouri 1999, Duranton and Puga 2004, or Rey and Janikas 2005). 
 
The strengths of the discipline have helped carry it up the assorted curves of left-hand regional 
science. Theories and methods applied to regional growth and convergence, regional income 
inequality, innovation diffusion, and migration have all helped to explain how and where growth 
occurs and how regions interact with each other within a context of growth. In addition, the rich 
methods of regional science and expertise developed regarding spatial units and scale mean that 
the field is almost uniquely positioned to contribute to a “right-hand” world, one in which lack of 
growth, shrinkage, or increased inequality (whether social or spatial) appears more frequently. In 
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this context, solid policy development, new theoretical perspectives, and improved 
methodological tools all require an understanding of how a new world order (or at least regional 
order) may be emerging.  
 
A key strength of regional science is the toolkit of methods and models that have been fine-tuned 
over decades of regional research (for the case of input-output modeling, see Batey 2016). 
Although an enormous range of methods exists within the field, two common elements emerge. 
First, because regional science is by nature regional, virtually any regional science application 
requires determination of the appropriate spatial unit, an understanding of the impact that choice 
of units may have on results (i.e. the modifiable areal unit problem, Openshaw and Taylor 1979), 
and preferably some connection between choice of unit and the spatial process under 
investigation. Size of units, characteristics of units, and the configuration thereof are all already 
important for so-called “left-hand” regional science. An open question is how—as patterns of 
geographic concentration or spatial inequality change, for example—choice of units might serve 
to expose or hide emerging trends and regularities that run contrary to received knowledge. 
Existing research rests on expectations of spatial spillovers and interactions across spatial scales. 
Not only may these expectations change in the future, but it will require regional researchers to 
be aware of the shifts. 
 
In addition, the issue of non-linearity is highly relevant. A classical transport-economics example 
explains how just a few extra cars on the road might cause the rest to be delayed. This implies 
that the marginal effect of an additional car strongly depends on the total number of cars that are 
present. Intuitively, a small reduction of cars might have an outsized positive effect on many 
other users/stakeholders in a region—but the magnitude of these effects in an environment of 
decline or stagnation is unknown. In the case of people, research tends to focus on the impact of 
additional people; how, when, and where losses of people might be felt is unknown. The 
transport example furthermore suggests that the effect of decline might not be felt or visible in 
the same localities where the depopulation takes place (Spencer 1997). 
 
Time is a fundamental aspect of Alonso’s description, as well. Development may be the 
underlying theme, but time governs the path towards inflection point, its timing, and also the 
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trend that follows on the right side. Regional spatial inequality may increase to a certain point 
before decreasing (or shifting up a gear to a higher level, as certainly seems possible), but the 
time scale governing the process determines whether this happens over years, decades, or 
centuries. When the time scale gets larger, focusing on path dependency becomes important (see 
Martin and Sunley 2006). 
 
Another common thread running through most regional science methods or guiding principles is 
the simultaneous consideration of multiple contributors to regional change. A region may grow 
and this will depend to some extent on its location, neighbors, and larger spatial context. It will 
also depend on demographic and economic factors and the interplay between these. Migration 
research within a regional science context, for example, generally addresses migrant 
characteristics, but also characteristics of origins and destinations. Regional concentration, 
whether of people or economic activity, requires not only consideration of the spatial aspects 
suggested above, but also an understanding of the interplay between people, location, and 
economy. Regional science excels at this.  
 
Consider for example Alonso’s social and spatial inequality bells. Each is treated individually in 
Alonso’s description (although another fundamental argument he makes is that interactions 
across curves are important to study), even though some of the more interesting aspects of each 
have to do with their potential interactions. A fertile avenue of research in the social sciences has 
been the spatial manifestation of social inequality; that is, that societies may be unequal in 
distribution of income and this uneven distribution also plays out in space. Research on 
residential segregation, for example, is just one example of this interaction. Now suppose we 
consider changes in the interaction between social and spatial inequality that might occur in a 
larger context of economic/demographic stagnation or decline. Certainly, in a world where 
economic growth has slowed, some regions will continue to outperform others, even if at a lower 
level. This in turn affects social inequality; as noted above, all current signs point to entrenched 
income inequality, even in a larger environment of growth. Should the rate of development slow, 
or become negative, surely social inequality will suffer. It also seems likely that this will lead to 
increased spatial inequality (at multiple spatial scales, from local to regional to global) and that 
people and economic activity will become further concentrated. 
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5. CASE STUDY: POPULATION DECLINE 
Periods of population decline have been numerous throughout the history of humankind. 
However, this was mostly caused by increases in death rates through famine, epidemics, or war. 
In such high-mortality populations, simple improvements in survival through nutrition and 
hygiene quickly resulted in growing and younger populations. Today, we face decline that is 
largely related to a lowering of fertility rates below the replacement level of 2.1 children per 
women. In areas where natural growth rates are close to zero, population decline is also the result 
of outmigration (Franklin, 2014). Many examples at the urban level in developed countries show 
how a difficult economic climate in terms of, for example, employment initiates a process of 
selective out-migration (Friedrichs 1992). In addition, although we emphasize demographic 
aspects of decline, loss of population is inextricably tied to forces operating at multiple spatial 
scales. Decline is thus inherently spatial. Measures and impacts of decline vary across spatial 
scales (or should: little research exists to examine this hypothesis). Understanding of decline 
requires conceptual and analytical tools that allow space and time to be considered 
simultaneously. 
 
Economic development and decline 
What is it exactly we are afraid of? It is generally assumed that a declining population implies 
lower demand and hence slower output growth, unless it is compensated for by new production 
technologies. This heavily depends on the assumption of similar preferences of current and 
future consumers, and thus of similar consumption behaviour  (Dalen and Henkens 2011). 
However, so far, no proof has been found of a positive relationship between population size and 
GDP per head or between the growth rates of these variables (Coleman and Rowthorn 2011). 
Nor has population decline in developed countries led to economic decline per capita so far. 
However, at the regional level, these relationships might actually exist. An interesting study 
conducted in the Netherlands shows that people are well aware of “the potential economic 
disadvantages of population decline,” but that they also anticipate and appreciate the potential 
intangible advantages (Dalen and Henkens 2011). 
 
Social inequality  
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“The prospect of population decline can be of considerable importance for an extensive welfare 
state” (Dalen and Henkens 2011, 444). In particular in so-called “pay-as-you-go” pension 
systems, the payments will exceed the contributions. Countries (and regions) with ageing 
populations will face an even less sustainable financial basis. This financial basis is likely to be 
threatened when government expenditures are fixed or slow to adjust (Brunner 1996). In addition 
important challenges appear when population levels drop below thresholds that are needed to 
finance indispensable public facilities (e.g., schools, hospitals, public transport) (Dalen and 
Henkens, 2011; see also Feser and Sweeney 2003)). Here a complex challenge arises not only of 
funding public facilities and infrastructure with decreasing resources but also maintaining some 
minimum level of service provision that, in the face of declining population densities, increases 
in cost. Raising taxes for the ones who stay behind will either increase out-migration or increase 
social inequality when certain groups of people do not have the resources to leave. 
 
Regional inequality  
In certain areas, decline might result in less unemployment and higher wages, resulting in more 
equity in terms of regional income. However, when firms decide to leave or have to close due to 
a declining number of customers, this positive development will halt. A lower level of regional 
income will affect expenditures on all types of goods, as well as on houses. When an area 
becomes less popular for whatever reason, the prices of houses might drop. For young people 
who have yet to enter the housing market this may be good news, but for homeowners the 
consequences of population decline might be disastrous (Dalen and Henkens 2011). In particular 
households with a long-term mortgage based on the original, higher housing price can be locked 
into a situation where they have no choice to “vote with their feet” anymore. This will increase 
regional inequality in terms of income and age-structure, as well as in terms of public finances.  
 
Geographic concentration 
An important element of the debate on decline is that the geographical perspective matters. 
Regional and urban decline are in most countries accompanied by growth in other regions or 
cities (Coleman and Rowthorn 2011, van Leeuwen 2015). As with growth, decline should not be 
expected to be evenly spread over society or over space. This is likely to increase social and 
regional inequality. Often it is thought that decline mainly hits rural regions. However, when 
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taking into account Europe as a whole, it appears that the share of people potentially affected by 
population decline in rural and urban regions is very similar (European Union 2010). Instead, it 
is the intermediate regions that most frequently face population decline.3 
 
Shrinkage in urban areas mostly takes place in “structurally weak areas such as old industrialized 
rust belts or in towns on the periphery of the urban system” (Wiechmann and Pallagst 2012, 
262). Such economic decline can be caused by the loss of the relative economic position of a city 
in a wider market, for example because of the maturation of an important sector within the urban 
economy (Markusen 1985). Rural decline is mostly observed in the least accessible regions. 
Here, a lack of jobs and opportunities often pushes people out (Andersen and van Kempen 2003; 
Guimarães et al. 2016). The accessible rural areas on the other hand often seem to gain 
population, since they are places with high levels of amenities and good access to urban services. 
Overall, these developments suggest lower regional concentrations but a stronger divide between 
accessible and inaccessible areas. 
 
While both growth and decline at the local level might result from coinciding unexpected and 
unrelated events (large firms that decide to locate or leave; incapable politicians; local birth or 
death booms), decline at the regional level could indicate more structural issues. When local 
governments, for example, try to prevent future decline and start a “race to the bottom” by trying 
to attract people or businesses from other regions or countries, this can clearly result in a 
situation where improving the situation in one region impairs the problems of a neighbouring one 
(Dalen and Henkens 2011). Studying the links between spatial spillovers, income convergence, 
and inequality is of utmost importance (Rey and Janikas 2005). This should not only be done at 
the regional, macro level, but also at the local or even individual, micro level, in order to better 
understand causalities between important dynamics. 
 
Demographic transition 
To understand the economic effect of decline, it is important to understand what happens to the 
population structure. The effect of decline caused by the migration of skilled workers or 
decreasing fertility rates will be very different. This is mainly due to the different population 
                                                     
3 As well as the highest share of population among the three types of regions. 
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dependence ratios and its effect on productivity levels. Regions with more job opportunities are 
known to be more appealing in particular to the young adult population (Arnott and Chaves 
2012; Lutz 2001). Because youth are less attached to their city of residence, they are therefore 
more likely to leave shrinking regions compared to the older, more established residents 
(Zimmermann 2005). City councils’ fears of declining communities are therefore 
understandable. When firms or households leave a specific region, this may hint to other 
entrepreneurs and citizens that an area is at the forefront of a period of economic stagnation or 
decline (Dalen and Henkens 2011).  
 
In rural areas, population decline can be caused by both out- and in-migration. Out-migration can 
be caused by a lack of employment opportunities. However, certain areas are very much 
appreciated by high(er) income middle-aged and elderly who appreciate the countryside. Even 
though such well-off households might be good for the local economy, when they replace 
indigenous, larger families, a net loss of population can occur (Spencer 1997). In particular in 
very attractive areas this can result in a paradox of a high residential demand accompanied with 
depopulation when not enough new houses are built to offset falling average household size 
(Spencer 1997). 
 
Less is more? 
A change of mind-set is one of the most important developments that needs to take place to be 
able to deal with—and perhaps even take advantage of—population decline. Although politicians 
already use provocative slogans such as “Less is more,” or “Opportunities through decline,” 
decline still has a negative connotation. However, why would planning for decline be more 
difficult than planning for growth? Is it that costs of congestion and pollution are generally 
neglected, because it is natural to focus on growth? Costs of congestion and crowding will 
decline with smaller populations. In certain areas, this will result in lower journey to work times, 
less traffic, and fewer related accidents (Coleman and Rowthorn 2011). In addition, emissions 
and pollution of all kinds are likely to fall with benefits for human health (Costello et al., 2009). 
Moreover, certain areas will benefit from more space and opportunities for natural areas. The 
advantages of more physical space and greater flexibility in land-use can be seen in Japan 
(Coulmas and Lützeler 2011), but also in the Netherlands. Place attachment might be the key to 
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encouraging residents to participate in local strategies and initiatives to make “shrinkage an 
opportunity rather than a threat” (Hospers, 2013).  
 
5. CONCLUSION: SOME CHALLENGES FOR REGIONAL SCIENCE 
Alonso’s presidential address and his taxonomy of development “bells” provide one lens through 
which to characterize humankind’s progress through various development states. A strength of 
Alonso’s approach, we believe, is his conceptualization of development processes as bell shapes 
that necessarily possess pre- and post-inflection point identities. Regional science, social science, 
and quite possibly human nature, as well, tend to judge progress and development in terms of 
growth. Alonso’s framework allows for identical processes to operate under different regimes or 
paradigms (both growth and decline), and this in turn has implications for the theories and 
methods underpinning most existing regional science research. This paper has brought Alonso’s 
five bells into the 21st century and has attempted to address some of the implications of his 
arguments for our field. Below we lay out a few thoughts on a potential research roadmap for a 
“right-hand” regional science, emphasizing especially the ways in which the discipline could 
contribute to the study of population decline. 
 
First, deciding on the appropriate spatial scale is a very important but often under-rated research 
step. The “relevant” space (and time period) should be defined by the spatial processes under 
study, such as migration and commuting patterns, the diffusion of ideas and information, or the 
development of entrepreneurial activities (Meentemeyer 1989). Consequently, it is important to 
realize that the relevance and significance of factors often differs at different spatial levels. 
Studying interactions across spatial processes and the inherently different spatial scales calls for 
theoretical innovations. Second, when focusing on regional differences it is important to take a 
multi-dimensional focus. When looking at “living standards” for example it is not always 
meaningful to compare absolute values or even certain relative ones. Average values can hide 
important underlying structural patterns of inequality. But more importantly, they often lack 
insight in composition effects. A declining region might have a relatively low average income, 
not due to negative externalities but because the type of jobs present. 
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Along these lines, we see two particular arenas where regional scientists could help develop new 
knowledge. The first is theoretical: what does what we have learned so far about regional 
configuration, interaction, and dependence suggest for post-inflection point portions of Alonso’s 
curves, assuming these inflection points exist and are identifiable? The second is topical: in 
regional science, as in other social sciences, issues surrounding quality of life, economic 
development, or transportation rest on assumptions of growth, or at least the assumption that the 
best predictors of the future are what has occurred in the past. How can we begin to speculate 
about the range of future possibilities, given what we know? Building on both the theoretical and 
the topical, we have here provided a case study—population decline—that exemplifies much of 
what Alonso alludes to in his piece and highlights the dearth of current thinking on the subject in 
regional science, as well as how the issue is so clearly one that falls within the purview of the 
discipline. 
 
We close by noting that, although post-inflection point research on Alonso’s five bells begs for 
theoretical and topical contributions, some of the key challenges are purely practical. Will 
existing measures and definitions capture or obscure major shifts in development curves, such as 
geographical concentration or regional inequality? Where population loss is concerned, can we 
define thresholds of certain variables after which decline becomes a real problem—for example, 
thresholds in the total number of people within a community, or the number of public facilities, 
of the level of diversity (in terms of age, cultural background, income)? Population decline 
involves an absence of something; how do we study the people who are no longer in a location? 
Here, too, there are fruitful avenues of research to be pursued. 
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